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STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, ^ 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STEELE RANCH, a Utah Cor-
poration, et al., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State 
Road Commission to acquire certain real property in 
Juab County for the purpose of constructing a Project 
of the 1-15 Freeway. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the trial of this matter the State Road Com-
mission made a motion for a new trial which was denied 
by the District Court. 
Case No. 
13544 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah State Road Commission, Plaintiff-Appel-
lant in the action seeks a reversal of the court's denial 
together with an order that the case be remanded for new 
trial before a neutral jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By this action in Eminent Domain the State of Utah 
sought to acquire 66.33 acres in fee and 5.45 acres in 
temporary easement from the Steele Ranch Corporation 
lands of about 2500 acres total in northern Juab County 
for the 1-15 freeway. At the time of condemnation a por-
tion of the ranch lands were being purchased from 
McPhersons and Howards resulting in the initial filing 
of three separate lawsuits (State v. Steele Ranch Cor-
poration, Civil No. 4632; State v. McPherson, et al., Civil 
No. 4634 and State v. Howard, et al., Civil No. 4633). 
The three cases were consolidated as one case for trial 
and also for appeal under State v. Steele Ranch Corpora-
tion, et al., Supreme Court No. 13544. 
Defendant Steele Ranch Corporation is owned by 
Dr. John G. Steele, M.D., a Nephi physician who lives 
at his home, a small plot of approximately one acre ad-
joining the ranch but reserved in personal ownership for 
his house and adjoining swimming pool. The non-access 
freeway divided the ranch into an east portion and west 
portion with access through the freeway provided by an 
underpass on the east-west lA section line in Section 27. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A map illustrating the pertinent portion of the ranch 
and freeway is included at the end of this brief as a refer-
ence for the convenience of the court. 
After the pre-trial order and just before trial, the 
court granted defendant's motion to join John G. Steele 
and his wife Thelma personally as defendants (File 4634 
at P. 68) but failed to expressly rule on plaintiff's Motion 
in Limine (File No. 4634 at P. 56), both motions being 
heard on the same day and taken under advisement. 
At trial on September 19, 20 and 21, 1973, the range 
of testimony was presented as follows: 
Mr. Victor Smith for the State (T. 220-224) 
Land taken $ 18,245.50 
Severance 21,057.70 
Total $ 39,303.20 
Mr. Wilbur Harding for Defendant (T. 153-157, 
172) 
Land taken $ 20,518.50 
Severance (approximately) 47,781.25 
Total $ 68,299.75 
John G. Steele owner (T. 115, 117) 
Land taken $ 27,852.00 
Severance 300,000.00 
Total $127,852.00 
The jury award was $21,164.50 for land taken and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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$75,000 for severance damage or a total of $96,164.50 (File 
No. 4634 at P. 150) almost $30,000 more than the testi-
mony of defendant's own witness. After the Judgment 
on the Verdict was entered the state made a motion for 
new trial which was denied resulting in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVI-
DENCE OF A SEPARATE PARCEL AS 
PART OF THE TOTAL TRACT OF SUB-
JECT PROPERTY WHERE NEITHER THE 
OWNERSHIP NOR THE USE OF THE SEP-
ARATE PARCEL WERE THE SAME AS 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
The land acquired by the state for highway purposes 
was a portion of a 2500 acre tract owned by Steele Ranch 
Corporation. John G. Steele was the sole owner of the 
stock of the corporation (Tr. 90). Adjacent to the ranch 
property is a one acre tract which is not owned by the 
corporation but which is separately owned by Dr. Steele 
as an individual (Tr. 90). This one acre tract contains 
only Steele's home and swimming pool. None of the out 
buildings or corrals which may be associated with the 
operation of the ranch are located on the one acre (De-
fendant's Exhibits 9-1, 9-2, 9-23). Evidence concerning 
the effect of the freeway on the separate home area was 
adduced at trial over the state's objection (Tr. 91, 93, 
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119). Appellant submits that the objection was proper 
and that the evidence should not have been admitted. 
First, severance damages are not allowed to land 
which has a different owner than that of the tract from 
which property was condemned. 
It is, of course, essential to constitute a 
single parcel that it be owned in its entirety by 
one owner or one set of owners. Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain § 14.31(2). 
In this case, the owner of the tract from which property 
was condemned is not the same as the owner of the home 
area. The oorporation owned the condemned property 
while Dr. Steele himself owned the home area. There-
fore, the two parcels cannot constitute a single tract for 
the purpose of awarding severance damages for the latter. 
The corporation is the only party from which land was 
acquired. It is recognized by the law as a legal person. 
Steele, although he owns 100% of the stock of the Steele 
Ranch, has no interest in the land. The land is owned 
by the corporation, a separate legal entity. His personal 
ownership is limited to the corporate stock. The stock-
holder has created the corporation and the separate legal 
ownership of the property. He cannot waive the existence 
of that entity when the chosen form works to his disad-
vantage. 
The leading case on the matter of severance dam-
ages when there is a separation of ownership between in-
dividuals and a private oorporation created by them is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N. W. 2d 235, 95 
A. L. R. 2d 880 (1963). The facts in that case are similar 
to those in the Steele Ranch case. In the Jonas case, the 
taking was of land owned by the individuals. They sought 
to have adjoining land owned by a corporation which 
they controlled considered as part of the same parcel. 
The court refused to allow such consideration, saying: 
A corporation is treated as an entity sepa-
rate from its stockholders under all ordinary 
circumstances. Although courts have made ex-
ceptions under some circumstances, this has been 
done where applying the corporate fiction "would 
accomplish some fraudulent purpose, operate as 
a constructive fraud, or defeat some strong equit-
able claim . . . ." Those who are responsible for 
the existence of the corporation are, in those 
situations, prevented from using its separate ex-
istence to accomplish an unconscionable result. 
In the present case, those who created the cor-
poration in order to enjoy its advantages flow-
ing from its existence as a separate entity are 
asking that such existence be disregarded where 
it works a disadvantage to them. We do not 
consider it good policy to do so. Id., 121 N. W. 
2d 235. 
The Jonas case was recently cited by the Nebraska 
court as authority for refusing to disregard the corporate 
entity in a condemnation action. The court said that 
there had been no showing of any of the factors listed 
in Jonas as grounds for disregarding the corporation. 
Verzani v. State, 195 N. W. 2d 762 (Neb. 1972). The 
Nebraska court concluded that a corporation and its 
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stockholders are not considered as one and the same in 
a condemnation action because the different legal person-
ality of the corporate entity cannot be disregarded. 
Utah law is clear that a defendant cannot recover 
damages to land it does not own even though it may be 
used in connection with adjoining land. State v. LeSourd, 
24 Utah 2d 383, 472 P. 2d 939 (1970). The corporation 
does not own the home area, the owner of the ranch and 
the owners of the home are different persons, and the 
result is that there is no unity of title as required to in-
clude the home area as part of the subject property. 
Secondly, to be included in the subject tract the 
separate parcel must be used in a way which is inseper-
ably connected with the subject tract before the parcel 
can be designated as a part of the tract. 
. . . implicit in the definition of unity of use is 
the connotation that both parcels are so com-
pletely integrated, inseparable and inter-depen-
dent so as to make the operation of one impos-
sible without the operation of the other. Sams 
v. Redevelopment Authority, 431 Pa. 240, 244 
A. 2d 779 (1968). 
Such connection does not exist in this case. The 
home and swimming pool are the residence of a physician. 
While the home is near the subject tract the ranch opera-
tion is not dependent upon the location of a doctor's 
home. The day to day operation of the ranch is con-
ducted by the foreman who lives in the "ranch house" 
at the end of the county road east of the freeway (T. 
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121). The ranch house "over east" is also where the 
equipment is stored and maintained (T. 132). John Steele 
could live in any nearby city without affecting the value 
or the operation of the ranch. He could sell either the 
ranch or his home independently of the other. The fact 
is that the nearness of his home is not necessary to the 
ranch and just because he chooses to live close to the 
ranch does not compel the conclusion that the ranch is 
dependent upon his home. 
It is submitted that the court erred in allowing testi-
mony regarding a separate parcel where there was in-
sufficient unity of title and usage. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE WHICH 
RESULTED IN AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT 
AND ONE GIVEN UNDER PREJUDICE. 
The basic rule of law relative to any jury trial is 
that the jury must be fair and impartial to both parties. 
50 C. J. S. Juries, Sec. 226. It is submitted that a fair 
trial was not had in this matter. 
As the jury was selected at the outset of the trial 
many of the jurors knew Dr. Steele and several stated 
that he was their family doctor. Mr. Linton, presumably 
a patient, was excused without motion from either party 
(T. 18), as was Mr. Laird, the forest ranger (T. 14). Two 
other jurors were challenged for cause by the state. Mrs. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Howard was challenged because Dr. Steele was her fam-
ily doctor (T. 15), and who would be her doctor if "needed 
in a minute" (T. 27), also because her husband was cur-
rently Dr. Steele's insurance agent (T. 27), and because 
she seemed to have a reservation about the law of emi-
nent domain (T. 28). Mr. Jenkins was challenged be-
cause Dr. Steele was his family doctor (T. 19), because 
his mother was currently a patient seeing the doctor (T. 
19) and because he was not sure whether that relation-
ship might influence his judgment (T. 20). 
The court at first granted the state's challenges, as 
was proper (T. 31), then promptly reversed itself and 
denied the same challenges (T. 32). This reversal and 
denial of its challenges was prejudicial to the state since 
the state was then compelled to utilize the pre-emptory 
challenges for those jurors which the court would not 
remove for cause. The result was that four jurors were 
left who held a family doctor relationship with Dr. Steele 
and were called to pass judgment on the defendant's case: 
Mr. Mackey (T. 16), Mrs. Ballow (T. 17), Mr. Pickering, 
whose daughter was Dr. Steele's patient (T. 23) and 
Mr. Jones who owed a bill to Dr. Steele (T. 26). If Mr. 
Laird and Mr. Linton were removed for cause so should 
these others have been removed by the court. 
The court's error resulted in a situation where per-
sons with an extremely close relationship with Dr. Steele 
had to pass judgment on him and his case. While the 
family doctor relationship may not be specified in stat-
utes, it is one founded on high trust and one which by 
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its very nature is extremely close and intimate, in some 
respects more so than the relation between family mem-
bers or husband and wife; yet a relative or a spouse 
would never be allowed to sit in judgment. To ask those 
with such a close relation to pass judgment is error. 
The trend of authority is to exclude from 
juries all persons who by reason of their business 
or social relations past or present, with either of 
the parties, could be suspected of possible bias, 
even though the particular status or relation is 
not enumerated in the statutes declaring the 
qualifications of jurors and the grounds of chal-
lenge. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury, Sec. 321. 
The state submits that the court erred and that its 
error was prejudicial to the state. The bias of the jury 
becomes clear when viewed in the perspective of the ver-
dict almost $30,000 over the defendant's own witness. 
Where a verdict is clearly excessive and results from such 
bias and prejudice it is reversible. 
Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, and the trial court abused its discre-
tion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deny-
ing a motion for new trial, we may order the 
verdict set aside and a new trial granted. State 
v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347 (1968). 
The state submits that under the circumstances of 
the trial of this matter the state was prevented from 
having a fair trial, and the Judgment on the Verdict ought 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to be reversed and presented before a new and neutral 
panel of jurors. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND 
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR PREPOND-
ERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THERE-
FORE SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Two expert valuation witnesses submitted their opin-
ions at trial. Mr. Wilbur Harding testified for defendant, 
approximately $20,518.50 for land taken and approxi-
mately $47,781.25 for severance damage for a rounded 
total of $68,300 (T. 153-157,172). Mr. Victor Smith testi-
fied for the state that $18,245.50 was for land taken and 
$21,057.70 for severance damage for a total of $39,303.20 
(T. 220-224). The defendant testified to $27,852.00 for 
land taken and $100,000.00 for severance damage, for a 
total of $127,852.00 (T. 115, 117). 
The jury awarded $21,164.50 for land taken and 
$75,000 for severance damage for a total of $96,164.50 
(file 4634, P. 150). In making the award the jury chose 
to completely ignore the testimony of either expert ap-
praiser and awarded about $30,000 in excess of the testi-
mony of defendant's own witness as to market value 
and damage. In so doing the jury chose the personal, 
inexpert, unobjective feelings of Dr. Steele himself rather 
than the clear preponderance of expert opinion based on 
market values and experience. 
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It is submitted that under the circumstances of this 
trial, when the special relation of family doctor to some 
of the jurors is taken together with the excessive award 
made by the jury, the obvious and inescapable conclusion 
is that the award was made under bias and prejudice. A 
verdict excessive or arrived at under prejudice must be 
set aside. A verdict might be allowed to stand. . . . 
unless it is clearly and palpably, or flagrantly, 
against the weight of the evidence; or unless it 
appears that the jury have committed gross and 
palpable error, or have acted under improper 
bias, influence, or prejudice, or have mistaken 
the rules of law stating the measure of damages, 
or have rendered a verdict so excessive as to 
shock the enlightened conscience of the court. 
27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, 471. 
The state submits that the verdict in the instant case 
was excessive, was arrived at under prejudice and was 
against the clear preponderance of the evidence at trial 
and therefore cannot be allowed to stand. 
In the case of State v. Barnes, 443 P. 2d 16 (Mont. 
1968), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
and held that a new trial was proper when the jury re-
turned a land value above the expert's opinion, even 
though the total award of $44,379 was well under the 
highest total testimony of $92,000 by Mr. Barnes the 
landowner. The court in Barnes said: 
It is a fundamental and well established 
rule of law that the burden of proof as to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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amount of damages in condemnation proceedings 
is upon the property owner. Here, by expert 
testimony, the highest figure for the land and 
improvements taken was $9,856 and the trial 
court erred in denying a motion for new trial 
when the jury failed to find in this or a lesser 
amount. State v. Barnes, 443 P. 2d 16 (Mont. 
1968). 
Utah law reveals one case where the verdict was 
higher than the expert testimony as to severance dam-
ages. The district court denied a new trial, but the Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the case to be heard 
again because the verdict was excessive. The court said: 
It is true that the verdict might be so grossly 
excessive and disproportionate to the injury that 
we could say from that fact alone that as a mat-
ter of law the verdict must have been arrived at 
by passion or prejudice. (Emphasis added.) But 
the facts must be such that the excess can be 
determined as a matter of law, or the verdict 
must be so excessive as to be shocking to one's 
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, preju-
dice, or corruption on the part of the jury. State 
v. Silliman, 448 P. 2d 347, 22 Utah 2d 33 (1968). 
It is submitted that the instant case is also a case where 
the verdict cannot stand because it is grossly excessive, 
and also because it is contrary to the evidence and be-
cause of the bias on the part of the jury. 
In a second Utah case, State v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 
184, 478 P. 2d 507 (1970), which has considered the ques-
tion this court affirmed an award of $35,075, slightly over 
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$1,600 more (about 5%) than testified to by the defen-
dant's expert witness. But that case is clearly distinguish-
able because there the "single fact that the verdict was 
in excess" was the only item considered by the court, 
whereas in the instant case jurors had a close relation-
ship with defendant, the verdict was grossly excessive l 
over the expert's opinion (more than 40% higher) and 
clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 
In the Dillree case Justice Henriod dissented arguing 
that the defendant should be bound by the testimony of 
his own expert witness. His logic is instructive in this 
« 
case: 
He called this witness and should accept his 
figure, since his evidence is no stronger than his 
strongest link, much less its weakest, and his 
own testimony obviously self-serving even by 
the facts related in the main opinion, not based 
on the accepted test for damages, should be re-
stricted to the test of his own chosen expert wit-
ness based on market, not opinion value . . . It 
would be unthinkable to affirm a jury's verdict 
based on the value to the owner of his pride of 
production that may be quite unattractive to 
one cruising in the market overt. State v. Dillree, 
25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507 (1970). 
It is submitted here that because of the circum-
stances of the instant case the defendant must also be 
bound by his own expert and that to affirm such a grossly 
excessive award is to permit the jury to speculate on the 
landowner's own biased statement of what he thinks he 
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ought to be awarded and to disregard any considered 
opinion of value as actually reflected in the market. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVI-
DENCE OF THE ORIGINAL APPRAISAL 
AND AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT BEFORE THE 
JURY CONTRARY TO LAW. 
During cross-examination of the state's expert ap-
praiser, counsel for defendant asked Mr. Smith about 
Exhibit D-12, the original appraisal which was the basis 
for the deposit made at the time of the Order of Occu-
pancy in this matter. Over objection the trial court al-
lowed defendant's counsel to proceed with the line of 
questioning (T. 238-241) and subsequently allowed Ex-
hibit D-12 to be received in evidence, again over objection 
(T. 245). To do so is clearly contrary to Utah Law: 
If the motion (for Order of Occupancy) is 
granted, the court or judge shall enter its order 
requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent 
to occupancy to file with the clerk of the court, 
a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the condemn-
ing authority's appraised valuation of the prop-
erty sought to be condemned. The amount thus 
fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion 
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on 
final hearing. 78-34-9 U. C. A. as Amended. (Em-
phasis added.) 
The legislature obviously chose to consider the 
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amount of deposit as not being relevant to the court pro-
ceeding and by statute expressly instructed the court 
that the amount "shall not be admitted in evidence on 
final hearing." The court allowed the figure and exhibit 
into evidence in direct contravention of the statute there-
by allowing the jury to consider an irrelevant, immaterial 
and highly confusing figure. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict in this case exceeded the defendant's 
own expert witness by almost $30,000. The court's error 
in denying the state's challenges for cause prevented the 
removal from the jury of those jurors having a close and 
personal family doctor relation. Moreover, the verdict 
was clearly grossly excessive over the defendant's own 
expert witness and contrary to the preponderance of this 
evidence. Such a verdict is given under prejudice and 
must be reversed. 
The court also erred in allowing evidence that the 
separate parcel was part of an integrated ranch operation 
where the ownership and usage of this separate parcel 
are not the same. The erroneous admissions of that evi-
dence before the jury caused the jury to speculate as to 
severance damage to property not inseparably connected 
with the ranch and therefore to property irrelevant and 
immaterial to this lawsuit. 
Moreover, the jury was confused by the erroneous 
admission of evidence of the original appraisal and de-
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posit figure which was in no way relevant or material to 
the issue of value at trial. 
The state submits that the district court's errors are 
substantial and that when considered in light of the spe-
cial relation between some members of this jury and Dr. 
Steele and when taken together with the grossly excessive 
award, the verdict is found to have been given under 
prejudice. The verdict must be reversed and the case 
remanded for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
JOHN s. MCALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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